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In the preliminary report of his investigation of "The Consciousness of Meaning," Professor Ogden offered some results obtained by employing the method used at Würzburg. Four series of experiments, with four observers offer a variety of results. The reaction times in part are regular, and in part irregular. In all observers, imageless thoughts predominate over images, while the presence of images tends to be relatively independent of the concrete or abstract character of the stimulus word.

In his paper on "The Psychology of Prejudice," Professor Morse presented analyses which led to the rejection of the view that prejudice is the same as apperception. Prejudice is rather the refusal or inability to apperceive, and arises from an undue prepossession for or against an idea, an object, or an act.

In analyzing "The Concept of the Laws of Nature," Dr. Richardson's paper considered the special views of Pearson and Taylor and endeavored to show "that purposiveness was not inconsistent with mechanical or scientific calculation, and natural laws have an ontological significance."

In his presidential address, Professor Lefevre contributed to the observance of the Darwinian semi-centenary by tracing in an ample way "The Growth of the Concept of Evolution Among the Greeks." The logical necessity of evolution was shown in the growth of viewpoints from the early physiologists to Aristotle. The latter's concept of potentiality, development, and entelechy, or his teleological evolutionary idealism, was regarded as the logical consummation of the growth of the concept of evolution among the Greeks.

At the Wednesday forenoon session of the Southern Educational Association, the secretary presented a detailed account of the history and the work of the society.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Idealism as a Practical Creed: being the Lectures on Philosophy and Modern Life delivered before the University of Sydney. HENRY JONES. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1909.

The title of this book is at once a paradox and a challenge. Idealism and practicalness! Can these be harmonized? "I always thought," says the ordinary man, "that if there was one thing more unpractical than another it was an ideal, and that if a man would be real he must come down from the hazy heights of dreamland and stand upon the solid earth of actuality." Nay, says Professor Jones, it is the idealist who is in touch with reality and the world of experience can only be rightly inter-

preted by its ideals. We make our own world and it is thought which legislates. And so idealism is a creed just because it is an interpretation of life. It is the key to nature and experience. Other keys have been tried, but they have proved inadequate. This is the only one which has been found to fit the lock, and give man entrance not only to the kingdom of heaven, but to the kingdoms of this earth as well.

Professor Jones is a Welshman and he has all the verve and intensity of the Celt. He is a seer not less than a thinker and his pages glow with color and his words strike fire as they come forth. The note of personal conviction constantly recurs. He utters here his assured belief—"the hypothesis of my life"—and he truly says that "no man has ever helped the world with what is to himself a 'may be' or 'perhaps.'"

The contents of the book were originally delivered as lectures before the University of Sidney, and in addressing the youth of a young country full of hope and enterprise his words not only take appropriately a practical shape, but aim at creating a spirit of patriotism and social responsibility. He begins his lectures with a suggestive quotation from Hegel's inaugural address at Heidelberg, to whose philosophy more than one sympathetic reference is made; and in his general tone he reminds us of Fichte's famous "Reden an die Deutsche Nation," which nearly a century ago aroused the enthusiasm of his countrymen. Professor Jones would remind this young Australian commonwealth that it is righteousness alone that exalteth a nation. Not military glory, not material prosperity, alone, valuable as these may be, but truth, spiritual ideals, great thoughts concerning man and God are "greater far than all these things." "I can form no higher wish for you than that it may be your destiny to try by actual experiment how far this faith of the idealists will stand the strain of a nation's practise."

The meaning which the author attaches to idealism is thus indicated. "Philosophy," he says, "is an attitude of mind rather than a doctrine." It is no finished, cut and dry formula. A final theory is not attainable nor is a fixed system to be sought. Experience changes and grows, and philosophy is experience becoming reflective, the mind or ego becoming conscious of itself and the world. It was Hegel who first gave to philosophy its modern form, its higher idealistic outlook. But this "way of looking at life" is confined to no school, it is the possession of all our noblest thought and greatest poetry.

If the author confines himself in these lectures to this particular form of philosophy it is because, as he believes, it is that "which is most in touch with our modern life and most akin to the poetry in which that life has found its best expression," and "the principles of this philosophy have entered deeply into the theoretic and practical life of our times." For, after all, ideas are the only agents in man's life. "Man is always pursuing *ends* great or small." "It is the *idea* of that which seems to him desirable, not his mere muscles or nerves, or bare sense and impulse, which carries him to his every act." But if idealism is the reflective or purposive view of life as distinguished from the irreflective and instinctive, it is no less the poetic or imaginative, as contrasted with the prosaic,

hence philosophy and poetry are really one in their aim. And indeed in another aspect of it, it is the religious view as opposed to what Martineau calls "the profane." In short, the conviction shared by all greatest minds alike "seems to me that of the unity and the spiritual purpose of the world—why indeed may I not call it the hypothesis of the Nazarene teacher as to the nature of God?"

In lectures two, three, and four, under the headings "First the Blade," "Then the Ear," "After that the Full Corn," our author works out the development of idealism in history. All history, he shows, is sacred, and right and truth and freedom are gradually being evolved. The civilization of mankind is the process of evolving the idea of freedom and he seeks to show how the spirit of freedom "has been influenced by the idealism which is itself the effluence and manifestation of that life." The freedom of the individual and of society is at first a blind movement towards an unknown good which gradually attains to consciousness and self-knowledge. The eastern peoples had no genius for statecraft. Among them, as Hegel says, only one, the monarch, was free. Freedom first began to dawn on Greece, but it took at the outset the form of imagination. With the rise of reflective thought among the sophists, and especially in Socrates, the product of the imagination was destroyed. The individual conscience claimed universal rights. Hence gradually the old institutions perished and humanity was launched on a new enterprise. But emancipation is only the "alphabet of true freedom" and this negative aspect reaches its full expression in the French Revolution.

A process of restoration must follow the epoch of criticism and disintegration. Gradually must we learn to reconcile ourselves "to the conditions under which we must necessarily live, without compromising either their authority or our own freedom." The citizen must find himself in the state and the state express itself through the citizen. Positive freedom is arrived at when morality is socialized and society is moralized. If Professor Jones speaks of restoration he is no champion of conservatism, nor does he advocate any resuscitation of old forms and old traditions. The new freedom restores the ancient world, but reinterprets it. The life of humanity is for him a growth, a progress, an evolution. But it is no blind or mechanical process. "The one-increasing purpose" in which one good custom yields to a better is taking place through the free action of the individual reason not less than the pressure of experience. Ideals do not come to us ready-made from without. They are forged in the laboratory of our own experience. They arise in the course of our traffic with reality. While, in one sense, we make them, in another they make us. They are therefore aspects of one continuous rational development in which are revealed the true character and purpose of man.

In a fine chapter, which may be regarded by way of illustration of this principle, he treats of the idealism of Wordsworth and Browning. Both in their own way pled for the spiritual interpretation of the world and of man. It is the unique quality of the great poet as of the great philosopher that in all things they see the whole, viewing the world *sub specie æternitatis*. There is something inspiring in the view of life

inculcated by such choice spirits. They show us that there is one principle in the universe and that principle is spiritual. It is a splendid and heartening faith. But the question is, have they a right to it? Is it true?

This question naturally prepares the way for the two final chapters in the book, entitled "The Call of the Age" and "The Answer of Idealism," in which objections are met, and, after some subtle criticism of alternative solutions, the case for idealism is presented.

The last chapter is in one sense the most interesting, and for philosophy the most important in the volume, for in it lies the crux of the whole position. But to appreciate the cumulative force of this section it must be read as a whole.

Professor Jones has no faith in "hybrid theories" which avoid ultimate issues. Man is at his best only when he is in touch with ultimate issues. A theory can not stop short of unity, or take refuge behind its own incoherence. A God who is not infinite but limited is a God who is neither self-subsistent nor self-determined; a God above God, an absolute higher than an absolute is an impossible conception.

The objection of course has often been brought against the absolute of Hegel and all forms of the absolute idealism, that it stultifies human effort. If all is already achieved and man is but "thinking God's thoughts after him," is the world not an illusion? Professor Jones admits there can be no final reply of philosophy to this question. Philosophy has but to interpret experience, not to say what it ought to be or how it might be other than it is. It is not a finished world, if you like. God is working in us and through us. It is the part of knowledge to discover the order already existent in the world; and of a moral agent to reveal the ideality of the world, recognizing and obeying its laws and making himself their willing instrument. "The moral agent who can raise himself and his world to the condition in which they 'ought to be' must contain the possibilities of that change within himself and find them also in his world." "Man reveals himself by means of it (the process) and it reveals its nature by means of man." "Verily it is *man* who is in the making, and not the great universe nor his God."

We are "thrown back upon absolute alternatives." Professor Jones does not minimize the pathetic scene of human history, or attempt to call evil good. If we learn through error and find through evil that good is best, we must not overstep experience or flee to an imaginary realm where knowledge and goodness have no possible opposites. We will not take refuge in Mr. Bradley's absolute, in which all the differences of finite experience are transcended because finite predicates have lost their earthly significance. Good and evil are vitally connected and correlated. But correlation does not mean that both terms of it are of equal worth. The unity in which the opposites of experience meet is not a "tertium," separate and above them, but is one of those opposites themselves. "This view, I believe, is true." "The process of morality is a process of interpretation, of obedience, and of the appropriation of that which is, and which is deemed right and good." The two sides of the correlation are not merely abstract ideas. When a man speaks of "duty," "moral good,"

"right," he has already invested these conceptions with absolute authority and he has, so to speak, thrown his own personality into the balance. The "good" carries with it its own justification; it exists in its own right. And the recognition of it as good is the acknowledgment of its complete autonomy and self-sufficiency. "In obeying its behests the moral agent is aware that he is bowing to a necessity which is complete, whose claim upon him is absolute, capable of no compromise." "Man's conception of the good may be, and is, inadequate . . ., but at every stage it stands before him as absolute in its worth and authority, a necessity he dare not question and, in the degree to which he is moralized, does not desire to question, but to obey."

Without following our author further, we may say a stronger or more satisfactory plea for the idealistic interpretation of life has seldom been made. It is the plea of a man who has thought in earnest. It is no mere theory, it is, he believes, a working faith—"the sanest hypothesis that the mind of man has discovered as yet." Tried by all the tests which reason knows, it will be found to stand. It does better justice to the meaning of the world than materialism. The idea of order "works better" than disorder. "It is a hypothesis which distorts reality less; which finds reasonable room for more of its facts." If Professor Jones seems in these sentences to acknowledge the test of pragmatism, a perusal of his book will not fail to prove that he has no sympathy with the view that a theory is true simply because "it works best." But tried even by this test, these conceptions "will be admitted to be essentially constitutive of the experiences of our day as expressed in its greatest poetic, philosophic, and religious literature." This does not show that the conceptions are true, nor even that they have practical import and real value. In one sense the conception of the unity and spiritual nature of reality has very great value, "even though it should prove—as Comte thought—to be only the departing shadow of a religious superstition." "It has been an incomparable anodyne to a suffering world." But we can not conclude from this fact alone that the conception is true. It may be only the "noble lie" which leads to truth. "The argument from desire"—that these ideas must be valid which meet man's deepest wants—is not convincing. "It rests upon optimistic presuppositions which have themselves to be verified." There is, in fact, no way of testing any truth except by reason. This does not mean that only the logical understanding can apprehend the truth. Poetry justifies itself in other ways, and poetry may convince "all the more effectively because it makes no logical pretensions." "For Reason is no abstract faculty, but a name for the whole man, who is himself the living totality of his own experience, when engaged upon discovering the true and the false."

Man is discovering his own nature and where his true good lies, through much failure and at a great cost. He is coming to himself through his intercourse with his fellows and the world, and interpreting them also in the process; and the one discovery which he is making, it seems certain, is that he is spirit—a mind set on knowing, and a will

fixed on good and finding it, seek it where he will, nowhere except in the things of the spirit.

This hypothesis, Professor Jones says, is at least worthy of being tried. For nations and for individuals it can only mean good. "I can form no higher wish for you as a nation," he says to his hearers, "than that it may be your destiny to try this faith by actual experience"; and for himself he concludes: "Nothing would I so willingly or gratefully make my inheritance forever as the example of those who have made its light the guide of their faltering footsteps."

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The Idea of the Soul. A. E. CRAWLEY. London: A. and C. Black. 1909. Pp. viii + 307.

Readers of Mr. Crawley's previous books, "The Mystic Rose" and "The Tree of Life"—the latter a somewhat amusing attempt to justify (Anglican?) Christianity by an appeal to anthropology—will know what to expect in this present volume. They will find much new matter on a deeply interesting theme, many fresh observations, and abundant material for cogitation and discussion. But their gratitude for the author's independence and originality will be tempered with regret at his constitutional inability to set forth his ideas in simple and connected fashion. Mr. Crawley's statements are dogmatic to an extreme; he appears to carry always a scientific chip on his shoulder. He moves from one topic to another with such rapidity that the reader grows breathless in pursuit of the fleeting thought. The whole discussion has a vagueness and generality which, one fears, must have been borrowed from its subject-matter.

Mr. Crawley begins with Tylor's theory of animism as set forth in the classical "Primitive Culture." He acknowledges the value of that work as a starting-point for further inquiry, but thinks that Tylor was more concerned with the place of animism in the evolution of culture than with its origin as a philosophical conception. In Tylor's explanation "there is no psychological precision—the fact being that his explanation was completed before the development of experimental psychology" (pp. 3-4).

As a general criticism, Mr. Crawley argues that Tylor, and one may add Spencer and his followers, over-estimated the importance of certain mental states as direct or indirect sources of animism. The "trance" is pathological. "Visions," or hallucinations of sight, are pathological. "It is illegitimate to base a universal phenomenon on abnormal facts" (p. 13). Epilepsy, hysteria, delirium, and mania, if they might substantiate notions already existing of the separable soul, have themselves nothing to do with the origin of the soul-idea.

We come next to dreams. Mr. Crawley asks whether inferences from and about dreams are really sufficient to originate the idea of the soul. He considers the dream-theory "psychologically impossible" (p. 15). Figures seen in dreams are not "phantoms"; to the savage they are more real, sometimes even larger, than what is seen when awake. Yet the idea of the soul in all its stages is that of "an ethereal, rarefied, and often